David Chalmers provides an alternative to the more radical dualism of Descartes. He is known for the clear explication of the “hard problem” of consciousness, that being examining the question of why physical substrates [such as a brain] would give rise to subjective conscious experience [mind]. He does suggest that the physical is necessary for conscious experience, but that the presence of consciousness is an emergent property that is of a higher level than the physical and, additionally, at least to some degree independent of it.
The famous thought experiment he devised to argue this perspective was that of Zombies. These special Zombie creatures are exactly like you or I, and their behavior would be indistinguishable from ours. However, these Zombies lack one quality which we each possess: the ability to feel experience, or qualia. The Zombie acts just as a person would, but has no internal experience of pain, joy, love, beauty, or anything else.
Could such a thing exist? Why or why not? If you think so, then you find some dualist perspectives persuasive. If not, you are clearly in the monist camp. If the Zombie has no experience of qualia what leads it to act?
An interesting consequence of this theory is that any system which reaches adequate levels of complexity would cause an emergent quality of consciousness: including thermostats, and even countries of individual people. His theory is also consistent with a pan-psychic philosophy, although that is not the direction he takes to consider questions of consciousness. Pan-psychism will, interestingly, be quite compatible with several other theories to be discussed.
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