This use of self reference may in some ways have equivalence to our own mental representations making reference to our selves or the ability to observe mental states. Theoretically the electrical and chemical processes of the brain could be understood in a mechanistic way. Yet, the actual experience of being seems to elude the reductionistic approach. The surprise of a new insight, perspective or understanding which was true but unknown may, in fact, be a rough equivalent of the true but unprovable Godel statement. These insights may come unbidden, or through self-reflection, or depth psychotherapy, but the surprise of the AHA moment creates a new whole of reality for the individual who experiences it. An interior depth of new views of a data set that is largely unchanged in detail, the meta-view of the self.

1.        Mathematics is inexhaustible.
2.        Any consistent formal theory of mathematics must contain undecidable propositions.
3.        No theorem-proving computer (or program) can prove all and only the true propositions of mathematics.
4.        No formal system of mathematics can be both consistent and complete.
5.        Mathematics is mechanically (or algorithmically) inexhaustible (or incompletable)

Certainly if mathematics, as the foundation of science, is without limit, that at least suggests that other aspects of reality are also without limit, inexhaustible, and contain “undecidable propositions.” There is no reason that this limitlessness should be necessarily limited to mathematics. Godel actually believed that he had demonstrated the truth of Platonism, but neglected to publish that further proof. This proof certainly does imply that “truths” are discovered from a larger field of reality rather than merely created as an arbitrary convenience.

Godel certainly believed that although brain states might be mathematically determined as measured by such things as electo-encephalograms or brain imaging techniques, nevertheless, neither of those techniques nor any other mathematically based technique could [even in theory] predict or determine the richness of consciousness. He was certainly accurate regarding the limitations of the abilities of digital systems like computers to emulate consciousness, and was a consultant to the Artificial Intelligence community until his death.

Each of these three note that based upon Godel’s Theorem [subject of an upcoming entry], it is not possible even theoretically for the mechanical predictable aspects of the electical/chemical brain to account for all the qualities associated with “mind.” Godel predicted the limitations of artificial intelligence in digital computing that have proved to be quite accurate, at least to date.

The three above authors all attempt to restore as reductionistic and physically based theory as possible, given the constraints of Godel’s Theorem. Chalmers and Penrose actually stated that the limitations provided by Godel’s Theorem could imply a more idealistic or mystical philosophy, but they specifically chose to stick to a more reductionistic explanation. I plan to take a more radical approach, approximating that of Amit Goswami, a physicist who wrote the rather stunning “The Self Aware Universe.”

More about Godel’s actual theorem next.

The famous thought experiment he devised to argue this perspective was that of Zombies. These special Zombie creatures are exactly like you or I, and their behavior would be indistinguishable from ours. However, these Zombies lack one quality which we each possess: the ability to feel experience, or qualia. The Zombie acts just as a person would, but has no internal experience of pain, joy, love, beauty, or anything else.

Could such a thing exist? Why or why not? If you think so, then you find some dualist perspectives persuasive. If not, you are clearly in the monist camp. If the Zombie has no experience of qualia what leads it to act?

An interesting consequence of this theory is that any system which reaches adequate levels of complexity would cause an emergent quality of consciousness: including thermostats, and even countries of individual people. His theory is also consistent with a pan-psychic philosophy, although that is not the direction he takes to consider questions of consciousness. Pan-psychism will, interestingly, be quite compatible with several other theories to be discussed.